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Abstract 
 
In her recent article “Realism and Idealism: Was Habermas’s Communicative Turn a Move in the Wrong 
Direction?” Maeve Cooke examines the evolution of Jürgen Habermas’s thought over the past five 
decades. According to Cooke, Habermas’s so-called “communicative turn” was a necessary step in his 
philosophy’s systematic attempt to derive a universal norm from the immanent context of human 
practices and institutions. In her opinion, however, Habermas is unable to uphold his pragmatically-based 
claim to “transcendence from within” without encountering problems of epistemic justification when it 
comes to his theory’s treatment of normative validity claims. Cooke believes that despite Habermas’ 
exhaustive efforts, any political theory that discredits the possibility of metaphysical truth inevitably 
relinquishes the “context-transcending moment” that his idea of validity is meant to capture. In this 
essay, I examine how Habermasian philosophy attempts to assimilate such criticisms by deriving its 
normative ideals from the Theory of Communicative Action. In conclusion, I seek to characterize the 
dilemma thusly: the epistemic criticism raised by Cooke places her in the unenviable position of 
defending metaphysically-justified validity claims—a pitfall that Habermas’ theory is designed to avoid.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In her recent article “Realism and Idealism: Was Habermas’s Communicative Turn a 
Move in the Wrong Direction?” Maeve Cooke examines the evolution of Jürgen 
Habermas’s thought over the past five decades. According to Cooke, Habermas’s so-
called “communicative turn” was a necessary step in his philosophy’s systematic 
attempt to derive a universal norm from the immanent context of human practices and 
institutions. In her opinion, however, Habermas’s theory is unable to achieve such 
“transcendence from within” due to the inherent problem of justification in his theory’s 
treatment of normative validity claims. Cooke believes that despite Habermas’s 
exhaustive efforts to provide a communication-based model for an ideal theory of law, 
any political theory that discredits the possibility of metaphysical truth inevitably 
relinquishes the “context-transcending moment” that his idea of validity is meant to 
capture. 
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I examine how Habermas derives the normative ideals of validity in democratic will-
formation from the Theory of Communicative Action, and compare this with the 
approach proposed by Cooke. In conclusion, I characterize their respective methods as 
mutually exclusive in terms of their assessment of the epistemic condition of 
modernity.   
 
Immanence and transcendence in critical theory: Habermas and the “new” 
realists 
 
Cooke is largely sympathetic towards Habermas’s overall approach to critical theory, 
and shares his aspirations for a “deliberative democracy” that emphasizes reason-based 
communication between citizens. In fact, most of her piece is devoted to defending 
Habermas’s position against more recent critical theorists such as Axel Honneth and 
Albena Azmanova, whom she refers to as the “new realists.” Their contention with 
Habermas revolves around the notion that his theory places insufficient emphasis on 
“empirical subjects in the real world.” In their view, a viable critical theory can instead 
be formed through a method of “normative reconstruction” based on political 
judgments that recognize the inherent subjectivity encountered in a complex pluralistic 
society (Cooke, 2012, p. 815). 
 
As Cooke points out, however, these theorists’ attempt to provide a historically-
contextualized account of social freedom and ethical life without resorting to so-called 
“ideal theory” is anything but new. Rather, “(the) concern to avoid abstract normative 
theorizing and to investigate the actual experiences of historically situated agents is as 
old as the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory itself” (Cooke, 2012, p. 813). 
Interestingly, Habermas himself began his career by employing a similar method of 
“normative reconstruction,” and, as Cooke notes, his reasons for abandoning it in favor 
of “rational reconstruction” continue to haunt the efforts of the new realists. Cooke 
traces three distinct phases of thought in Habermas’s writing that comprise 
(respectively) three distinct efforts at a normative justification for democracy: 1) a 
Marxist-Hegelian approach that attempts to situate democratic norms within the 
material conditions encountered in the world, 2) an epistemological approach that seeks 
to grant epistemic privilege to the concept of human benefit, and finally 3) the 
language-based theory of communicative rationality that Habermas has defended since 
the late 1970’s. Cooke believes that the new realists are “too simple” in their critique of 
Habermas, and fail to realize the extent to which their own theories lack a rational basis 
for normative claims. Here she believes Habermas is correct in confronting this 
problem and that “he is right to look to human communicative practices in order to find 
an answer” (Cooke, 2012, pp. 816-817).  
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Communication and ideals: The limits of rational reconstruction 
 
Cooke’s own disagreement with Habermas, on the other hand, engages his theory at the 
epistemological level of justification. She maintains that while his theory contains 
many valuable elements for political critique, it also falls short of its universalistic goal. 
As Cooke (2012) puts it “Habermas has confronted but not yet solved the problem of 
how to defend his theory’s context-transcending claims to validity” (p. 818). 
 
Cooke’s (2012) claim is that communicative reason ultimately fails to invoke universal 
ideals or guidelines, and should instead find its place within an intersubjective, 
pragmatically-comparative approach that includes “the interplay of reason and affect:” 
 
 ..the ultimate reference points for normative theorizing (transcendent objects 
such as truth and justice) are radically context transcending and as such 
inaccessible in their entirety to human beings; thus I posit an insurmountable 
gap between truth, justice and other transcendent reference points and the 
knowledge of them that is available by way of communicative reasoning. 
(p.819) 
 
Here the question arises: why, in Cooke’s view, are these reference points 
“inaccessible?” What are the implications of this claim for Habermas’s theory? To 
address this, I will briefly outline the Theory of Communicative Action in order to 
examine Habermas’s formulation of normative validity. In conclusion, I will return to 
Cooke’s argument against such a conception of validity and examine the implications 
of her own epistemic position.  
 
Communicative Action: The search for validity 
 
Habermas has always been interested in examining 1) the structural evolution of 
sociopolitical and economic systems in the twentieth century and 2) how the 
conceptions of knowledge and truth have undergone paradigmatic changes in the 
philosophy of science. Habermas seeks to place the justification for his democratic 
model in “postmetaphysical” terms that can accommodate what he sees as a 
coevolution of law and morality in political society, and so eschews both theological 
and ideological claims pertaining to human nature and well-being. His project consists 
of a comprehensive analysis of the social functions of language, drawing from other 
theorists such as G.H. Mead and J.L. Austin who explored the rational nature of 
language and attempted to define its modes and structures in communication. 
Habermas’s (1987) goal in this seems to be his concern with a “formal-pragmatic 
description” that can be expressed in terms of “a modern understanding of the world” 
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(p. 70). His contribution to political theory, then, is a model designed to avoid 
ideological claims while still retaining the ability to critique and diagnose the problems 
of modernity. For the purposes of the present discussion, we are concerned with how 
Habermas’s theory develops the vitally-important concept of context-transcending 
validity claims, that can appeal to universal norms “from within the the perspective of 
an existence situated in the world” [emphasis original] (Habermas, 1993b, p.107). 
Habermas (1987) begins with examining the nature of communicative speech acts and 
their functional role in social activity. Here his goal is to establish a “communication 
concept of rationality” (p.13) that can avoid the limitations imposed upon the validity 
of intuition or introspection in the twentieth century- by logical positivism on one side 
and behaviorism on the other (p. 11). Rather than become embroiled in this subject-
object debate, Habermas (1987) borrows from George Mead’s theory of 
communication that analyzes linguistic acts in exclusively social terms. The latter’s 
concept of communicative action provides him with a  functional, “nonreductionist 
concept of language” that can avoid scientific modernity’s assault upon the so-called 
“inner phase” of individual experience (p.12). 
 
Mead identifies three phases in the evolutionary development of language that will play 
heavily in Habermas’s own analysis of language:  
 
1) Gesture mediated actions, illustrated by animal behavior, naturally form an 
ontological starting point from which to study communication and language. Here the 
key concept of meaning is found to be embedded in the “functional circuit” of 
behavior- that is, a gesture and response relation between organisms results in a “field 
of meaning” for its participants. This relation, according to Habermas (1987), forms 
“the objective basis of the meaning that the gesture of one participant assumes for the 
other” [emphasis original] (pp. 16-17). 
 
2) Symbolically-oriented, or  signal-language, refers to the intermediate stage of 
language development. According to Habermas, this phase includes three vital 
transformations: 
a) The replacement of gestures with symbols that carry the same meaning for 
both participants.  
b) The emergence of communicative intent from the causal cycle of “stimulus-
response-stimulus.”  
c) A shift in the “structure of interaction” wherein participants encounter the 
necessary distinction between “acts of reaching understanding and acts of 
reaching success.” (This will underwrite Habermas’ own typification of action-
oriented speech as dependent upon mutual understanding, as will be shown 
below). 
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3) Propositionally differentiated speech acts, according to Mead, represent the final 
stage of linguistic evolution. Habermas, however, believes that the theory becomes 
mired in the categorically-problematic concept of “taking the attitude of the other,” and 
disagrees with Mead’s highly-complex formulation of how this particular transition 
occurs. His own proposal is to utilize two concepts already contained in Mead’s theory 
as a functional differentiation in language use: action and understanding: 
 
This problem can be dealt with if we distinguish, more clearly than did Mead 
himself, between language as a medium for reaching understanding and 
language as a medium for coordinating action and socializing individuals 
[emphasis mine]. (Habermas, 1987, p.31) 
 
Habermas’ goal here is to establish this two-track ontology as the basis from which to 
analyze the nature of propositional language. Where Mead tried to continue from the 
‘bottom up’ in terms of his causal-historical account of language, Habermas (1987) is 
convinced that the former’s genetic analysis of meaning between actors provides the 
conceptual tools to tackle propositional language from the ‘top down,’ so to speak. His 
theory of language borrows from Austin, who distinguishes two components inherent in 
speech acts: propositional and illocutionary (p. 75).  
 
Illocutionary Speech: The emergence of normative validity 
 
An illocutionary speech act is some statement that is action-oriented- in the words of 
J.C. Farnum (2001) “established as a promise, command, avowal, etc” (p.33). This 
form of speech, according to Habermas, is what carries the crucial concepts of meaning 
and communicative intent developed in Mead’s theory. Other forms of language such 
as describing the state of affairs in the world (i.e. locutionary) or attempting to 
influence others (i.e. perlocutionary) depend upon the twofold presuppositions of 
mutual understanding and action-orientation.1 Thus illocutionary speech acts are 
presupposed by other modes of speech, and so possess an inherent precedence in 
communication. As Habermas (1996) puts it: “Communicative action, then depends 
upon the use of language oriented to mutual understanding” (p. 18)  
 
Here we arrive at the heart of the matter pertaining to Habermas’ conception of 
validity: a universalizing ideal in language that rests on two inherent possibilities in 
communicative action: consensus and rationality. Habermas (1993a) will define these 
as mutually-interdependent features of any speech act directed towards action in the 
world:  
 
We are intuitively aware that we cannot rationally convince anyone, not even 
ourselves, of something if we do not accept as our common point of departure 
that all voices that are at all relevant should be heard, that the best arguments 
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available given the current state of our knowledge should be expressed, and that 
only the unforced force of the better argument should determine the “yes” and 
“no” responses of the participants. (p. 107) 
 
In other words, validity is that which conforms to the universal norms that are 
presupposed by the act of entering into communication. What Habermas hopes to 
accomplish with this definition is a dissolution of the tension between his concept of 
linguistic universality and the context of a historical-material world that it supposed to 
transcend. A communication-based concept of validity is meant to provide the tools to 
address both levels of this dilemma, and consequently provide a normative ideal for 
political critique: 
 
validity claims are Janus-faced: as universal, they outstrip every given context; 
at the same time, they must be raised and gain acceptance here and now if they 
are to sustain an agreement capable of coordinating action. (Habermas, 1993b, 
p.108) 
 
Knowledge, validity, and metaphysics: the epistemology of communicative reason 
In Habermas’s framework, although validity-claims are analogous to truth-claims, only 
validity-claims retain the power of contextual transcendence and can appeal to the 
(idealized) universal norms of discourse. While there is much more to say about the 
distinction between truth and validity, I hope to have provided a minimally sufficient 
sense of the latter concept to enable a further examination of Cooke’s critique. What 
does she mean when she says that truth and justice are “transcendent reference points” 
beyond the reach of communicative reasoning, and does she provide an alternative 
basis for such vital concepts?  
 
Habermas’s primary mistake, in Cooke’s view, has been an “overreliance on rational 
reconstruction and excessive confidence in the firmness of the footing on which formal 
pragmatics places critical theory.” The basis for this claim seems to arise not only from 
concerns over justification, but also from Cooke’s own viewpoint of human nature as it 
pertains to communication.2 As she sees it, reason-based argumentation forms but a 
part of individual “shifts in perception” from which political and moral convictions are 
formed, and “the force of the better argument” only partially captures the elusive 
concept of validity (Cooke, 2006, p. 111).  
 
There seems to be an inescapable dilemma contained within the parameters of this 
discussion when it comes to the role of religion in the public sphere. In the case of 
Cooke, the implications of her critique could not be starker: metaphysically grounded 
truth-claims, such as those based in religious belief, cannot in principle be excluded 
from the public process of argumentation. Whereas Habermas’s secular concept of 
reason necessitates this exclusion, Cooke believes that this is both a necessary and 
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unwanted feature of his theory’s attempt at postmetaphysical justification. Cooke has 
admitted that her position places her at odds with much of the last two centuries of 
epistemology,3 but is convinced that postmetaphysical thinking can never justify the 
concept of immanent transcendence (Habermas’s communicative reason 
notwithstanding). Here one must at least credit Cooke (2012) for her forthrightness: “I 
make the normativity of truth and justice partly dependent on a realm of value that is 
not the result of human behavior” (p. 819).  
 
Cooke concludes her article with two “speculative theses” that conform neither with 
Habermas nor the new realists. The first is the aforementioned “insurmountable gap” 
between any transcendent reference point and the knowledge gained through 
communicative reason. The second is that communicative reasoning retains some 
usefulness to critical theory in that it can “narrow the gap” between immanent facts and 
transcendent norms. Given that Cooke rejects postmetaphysical justification as a 
method, it is not surprising that she flatly characterizes her views as speculative and 
context-specific. As she sees it, any bottom-up, postmetaphysical theory is inherently 
incomplete when formulated and justified solely as such, and “the onus is on those who 
dispense with metaphysics to maintain this context-transcending moment without it” 
(Cooke, 2012, p. 819). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this essay I have sought to summarize the problem of postmetaphysical justification 
as conceived by Habermas and Cooke, and examine their disagreement over whether 
Habermas’s concept of validity succeeds as a strategy for solving the paradox of 
“immanent transcendence.” While there is much more to be said for each theorist’s 
views on truth and justification, their respective differences of approach seem 
fundamentally incompatible, if not mutually exclusive.  
 
I find Cooke’s critique at once appealing and troubling. Her pragmatic concern over the 
interplay of religious and nonreligious reasoning in public dialogue is (as Cooke notes) 
shared by Habermas, as shown by his own recent work. However, the source of their 
disagreement, as we have seen, rests in their treatment of justification in the face of 
modernity: universality, on Cooke’s account, is unjustifiable for any postmetaphysical 
theory, communicative or otherwise. In this it seems that Cooke struggles not only 
against Habermas’s model, but also the epistemic condition of modernity itself. With an 
eye towards praxis, I see this as a potentially fatal problem for any normative political 
theory. 
 
For this reason, Habermas remains unwilling to place his theory in such a speculative 
position. He sees modernity as an irreversible condition, and so would rather utilize 
than resist its conceptual tools. That is, where Cooke sees an “insurmountable gap” 
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between communicative reason and transcendent ideals, Habermas (1993b) instead sees 
communicative reason as the sole opportunity for a new concept of transcendence: 
 
The historicism of paradigms and world-pictures, now rife, is a second-level 
empiricism which undermines the serious task of confronting a subject who takes up a 
positive or negative stance towards validity-claims... But now it is argumentative 
reason itself which reveals, in the deeper layers of its own pragmatic presuppositions, 
the conditions for laying claim to an unconditional meaning. It thereby holds open the 
dimension of validity-claims which transcend social space and historical time... 
Without this, normality would close herself hermetically against any experience of a 
solidarity and justice that is lacking. (p.134) 
 
Whether or not Habermas’s approach is effective as a normative political theory, and to 
what degree, will be a subject of debate for years to come. While I see Cooke’s defense 
of metaphysically-justified validity claims as unrealizable in practice, her relatively 
novel line of critique does serve to illustrate the limited number of epistemic options 
available for modern political theory in general. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Cooke, Maeve. Re-presenting the Good Society. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2006. 
 
Cooke, Maeve. “Violating Neutrality? Religious Validity Claims and Democratic 
Legitimacy.”  Center for Global Ethics and Politics at the Ralph Bunche Institute, 
CUNY Graduate Center, 25 Oct. 2011. Web. 27 Dec. 2012.  
 
Cooke, Maeve. “Realism and Idealism: Was Habermas’s Communicative Turn a Move 
in the  Wrong Direction?” Political Theory 40.6 (2012): 811-21. 
http://ptx.sagepub.com. Dec. 2012. Web. Dec. 2012. 
 
Farnum, John C. “Habermas and the American Context: Toward a Theory of 
Substantive Democracy.” Diss. Florida State University, 2001. 2001. Web. 25 Nov. 
2012. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996.  
 
Habermas, Jürgen. Justification and Application. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1993a.  
Res Cogitans (2013) 4                                                                                                  Van Barriger | 115 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1990.  
 
Habermas, Jürgen. Religion and Rationality. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993b. 
  
Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon, 1987.  
 
 
                                                          
1 As Farnum (2001) puts it, “processes of communication rely on an ideal understanding 
of language-use that reveals the ever-present possibility of coordinating action via an 
uncoerced, intersubjective mode of social agreement.” (p.35). 
 
2Elsewhere, Cooke has leveled several internal critiques of Habermas’s justificatory 
framework that invite further examination, but I cannot address them here. 
 
3 See the Q&A section to Cooke’s presentation of her forthcoming paper ““Violating 
Neutrality? Religious Validity Claims and Democratic Legitimacy” (Discussion with 
Maeve Cooke. Center for Global Ethics and Politics at the Ralph Bunche Institute, 
CUNY Graduate Center, 25 Oct. 2011. Web. 27 Dec. 2012). 
